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Abstract 
 
 
This study complements existing literature on the aid-institutions nexus by focusing on political 
rights, aid volatilities and the post-Berlin Wall period. The findings show that while foreign aid 
does not have a significant effect on political rights, foreign aid volatilities do mitigate 
democracy in recipient countries. Such volatilities could be used by populist parties to promote a 
neocolonial agenda, instill nationalistic sentiments and consolidate their grip on power. This is 
especially the case when donors are asking for standards that majority of the population do not 
want and political leaders are unwilling to implement them. The empirical evidence is based on 
53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. As a main policy implication, creating 
uncertainties in foreign aid for political rights enhancement in African countries may achieve the 
opposite results. Other implications are discussed including the need for an ‘After Washington 
consensus’.  
JEL Classification: C53; F35; F47; O11; O55 
Keywords: Uncertainty; Foreign aid; Political Rights; Development; Africa 
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1. Introduction 
 The need for genuine democracy in Africa is now a subject of substantial consensus 
(Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009). The use of foreign aid as a policy instrument 
for the promotion of political rights in recipient countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall is also a 
widely accepted fact in policy making and academic circles (Gibson et al., 2014; Killick, 2003; 
Crawford, 2001; Carothers, 2000; Stokke, 2013; Hayman, 2011; Faust, 2010). There has also 
been a recent stream of studies consistent with celebrated aid literatures (‘The Bottom Billion’ 
(Collier, 2007), ‘Dead Aid’ (Moyo, 2009)) in putting to question the effectiveness of 
development assistance as a policy instrument (Krause, 2013; Banuri, 2013; Marglin, 2013; 
Wamboye et al., 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Monni & Spaventa, 2013; Titumir & Kamal, 2013). 
According to the narrative, the possibility of neocolonialism increasingly governing foreign aid 
has been advocated by Amin (2013). A position earlier shared by Kindiki (2011) on the necessity 
for African countries to strategically overcome dependence on international regimes/systems and 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on the entrapment of the continent within the matrices of colonial 
power. Obeng-Odoom (2013) has joined the chorus in asserting that aid policies should be 
complete process that clearly articulate the needs of African countries. This converges with 
Amin’s position that development models should not be limited to donor thoughts on what is 
good for the continent.   
 The policy of making foreign aid uncertain by donors to influence politics in recipient 
countries is the very essence of the political economy of foreign aid. In fact, foreign aid as an 
instrument of regime change and the strengthening of democratic political values has prominently 
featured in Zimbabwe, post Arab Spring conflicts and recently in the adverse criminalization of 
gays in Uganda. In other words, aid supply is substantially contingent on the willingness of 
recipient nations to comply with conditions and motivations of donor countries. Donors are 
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increasingly asking for higher standards of governance in exchange for their money. This is true, 
at least in theory of the Washington Consensus (WC)
1
 that prioritizes political rights over 
economic rights. In essence, consistent with Moyo (2013), the WC can be defined in three  
phrases: liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights. In the same vein 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall foreign aid became an instrument for the promotion of political 
rights (Gibson et al., 2014).  
 The interesting literature on foreign aid and institutions has centered around three main 
areas: the effect of foreign aid on institutional quality; whether donors grant more aid to countries 
with higher institutional standards and how aid can be used to improve institutional quality in 
recipient countries (Easterly, 2005). In line with the discourse, since poverty in African countries 
is substantially traceable to institutional bad quality, developed countries have to promote 
credible institutions in the continent (Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Amavilah, 1998; Alesina & 
Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Armah & Carl, 2008; Asongu, 2012a, 2013a; Jellal & 
Bouzahzah, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013; Djankov et al., 2008). As highlighted in the first 
paragraph above, foreign aid volatility may be used by donor countries for this purpose. This 
paper focuses on the third strand of the aid-institutions literature and aims to assess whether such 
uncertainties in foreign aid flows are means by which political rights could be promoted in 
African countries. The contribution of the inquiry is original in improving scholarly 
understanding of the aid-institutions debate in the light of the case Somaliland which does not 
receive official foreign aid. The corresponding research question is as follows: is the threat of 
foreign aid withdrawal an effective deterrent to political oppression? The question is addressed 
                                                 
1
 In line with Marangos (2009), while the Washington Consensus has ‘different versions and interpretations’, the 
definition employed in this study is with respect to Moyo (2013).  According to the author while the Washington 
Consensus can be defined as ‘private capitalism, liberal democracy & priority in political rights’, the Beijing 
Consensus is summarized as ‘state capitalism, de-emphasized democracy & priority in economic rights’.  
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by employing the Generalised Method of Moments on a sample of 53 African countries for the 
period 1996-2010.  
 While there has been a substantial literature on the aid-institution nexus, as far as we have 
reviewed, very few studies have focused on the aid-democracy relationship. The existing 
literature entails: general discourses or literature reviews (Brown, 2005), positive effects of aid on 
democratization (Knack, 2004), Kangoye (2011) using the same title as Knack to conclude that 
aid mitigates the negative impact of external shocks (terms of trade distortions) on democracy 
and Kano & Montinola (2009) conclude that aid helps autocrats (democrats) more in the long-run 
(short-term). The present study steers clear of the above literature from  two standpoints. First, it 
is focused on the period after the fall of the Berlin wall, essentially because the collapse of the 
wall was followed by a substantial change in aid-democracy policies (Gibson et al., 2014)
2
. 
Accordingly: Knack (2004) has used the period 1975-2000; Kangoye (2011), 1980-2003; Kano & 
Montinola (2009), 1960-1999; Kalyvitis & Vlachaki (2008), 1972-2004. Second, in light of 
stylized facts and recent developments in the aid debate, we focus on aid uncertainty.   
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the state of the debate on 
the aid-democracy nexus. Data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. The empirical 
analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.   
 
   
2. Foreign aid, institutions and democracy:  connecting the dots of recent debates 
  
The study extends ongoing debates in the aid-institutions literature: one old and two recent. The 
first is the old strand, the level and time hypotheses for democratic benefits (Scott, 1972; 
Lemarchand, 1972; Sayari, 1977; Varsee, 1997; Wade, 1985; Weyland, 1998; Sung, 2004; Back 
                                                 
2
 “The roots of the Washington consensus that grew in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War quickly changed this 
status quo: in addition to strong external pressure to liberalize, rulers began to face increasing constraints to using 
foreign aid to support their followers. While aid continued to flow, it came increasingly in forms far less amenable to 
patronage politics”. (p. 25) 
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& Hadenius, 2008; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Asongu, 2011; Asongu,  2012b). Second, 
China’s spectacular growth has led to a growing stream of debates on the priority of political 
rights (Washington Consensus) over economic rights (Beijing Consensus) in development 
models (Moyo, 2013; Ortmann, 2012;  Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; 
Asongu, 2014a; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014). Hence, the study improves on the Beijing Model 
and Washington Consensus debate in a twofold manner: (1) the Moyo’s (2013) conjecture on 
political versus economic rights and (2) the hypothesis that at the advent of globalization, poor 
countries are more concerned with economic rights in comparison to political rights (Lalountas et 
al., 2011; Asongu, 2014a).   Third, debates on the aid-institutions nexus, amongst others: the aid-
corruption relationship (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013; Asongu, 2012a, 2013a), 
verification of the celebrated Eubank (2012)
3
 literature (Asongu, 2015) and usage of the Eubank 
conjecture to extend some findings in the aid-governance literature (Kangoye, 2013 versus 
Asongu, 2014b).  
 We further discuss this section in two main strands: debates surrounding the aid-
institutions nexus and the aid-democracy relationship. The former is presented in three main 
streams: the time and level hypotheses for the benefits of institutional quality, the Washington 
consensus versus the Chinese model on priority of economic rights versus political rights in the 
scale of rights preferences and a recent wave of debates on aid and institutions.  
 The first stream focuses on the level and time hypotheses of institutional quality rewards. 
In essence, developing nations need to mature (time) and be strong (level) to fully reap the 
rewards of democratic institutions. With regards to the level of institutions hypothesis, it has been 
confirmed with the help of continuous governance measurements that institutional quality is 
highest in strongly democratic nations, medium in strongly authoritarian countries and least in 
                                                 
3
 Eubank (2012) received the best paper Award in 2013 from the Journal of Development Studies.  
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partially democratic countries. Employing different empirical specifications, non-linearity in the 
level hypothesis has been established as: J-shaped (Back & Hadenius, 2008); S-shaped (Sung, 
2004) or U-shaped (Montinola & Jackman, 2002). Asongu (2011) has verified this hypothesis in 
Africa by concluding that young or partial democratic countries perform worst (worse) relative to 
older or quasi-full democracies (autocracies). Regarding the time of exposure hypothesis, it has 
been established by Keefer (2007) that young (old) democracies have lower (higher) institutional 
quality. In accordance with Asongu (2012b), the level and time hypotheses have been reported in 
empirical and theoretical studies: Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972), Turkey (Sayari, 1977), India 
(Wade, 1985), post 1990 nations like Russia (Varsee, 1997), a considerable number of Latin 
American nations after the streams of democratization processes (Weyland, 1998) and, African 
nations (Lemarchand, 1972).  
 The second strand of studies involve the debate between the Beijing Consensus (BC) and 
Washington Consensus (WC) on the priority of economic over political rights in models of 
development (Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Asongu & Aminkeng, 
2013; Lalountas et al., 2011; Ortmann, 2012; Asongu, 2014a; Moyo, 2013). The debate has been 
heightened by China’s breath-taking tale of economic transformation. The success of the country 
has raised concerns over the orthodoxy of institutions preceding economic prosperity in the 
development process (Wang & Zheng, 2012; Tull, 2006). There is a thesis by the WC which 
postulates that economic rights should follow political rights (Clinton, 2011). On the other hand, 
an antithesis from the BC sustains that political rights should come after economic rights 
(Akomolafe, 2008; Ortmann, 2012). A third school of thought (or synthesis) has reconciled these 
two axes with a position that both the BC and WC are needed in the short-term and long-run 
respectively (Lalountas et al., 2011; Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a). According to this third 
narrative (also known as the Moyo hypothesis (Asongu, 2015)), for the WC to sustainably 
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prioritize political rights, a middle-class is needed to demand them genuinely. The core argument 
is that the BC is the model that can deliver the middle-class within the shortest spell of time. The 
synthesis further sustains that the WC should be the preferable long-term development strategy 
because it is a more inclusive model. The BC versus WC debate has also initiated a growing 
stream of studies on multi-polar development strategies (Wa Gĩthĩnji & Adesida, 2011; 
Babatunde, 2012; Fosu, 2010, 2012, 2013a; Nyarko, 2013a)
4
.  
 We briefly discuss some recent waves of debates on foreign aid and institutional quality. 
First, the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a, 2013a) discussion on the ‘effect of 
foreign aid on corruption’ has been reconciled by Asongu & Jellal (2013) using fiscal behavior 
channels. They have concluded that the impact depends on the transmission mechanisms of aid, 
among others, through government spending (tax effort or private investment) improves 
(mitigates) corruption. In this debate, Asongu (2012a) could not verify the Okada & Samreth 
results on the negative aid-corruption relationship in Africa.  He has further confirmed his 
position using the methodological framework of Okada & Samreth in Asongu (2013a). The 
textual literature of the celebrated Eubank (2012) literature on the negative incidence of aid on 
political governance has been empirically verified by Asongu (2015) using a taxation mechanism. 
In clarifying Kangoye (2013), Asongu (2014b) has further used the Eubank conjecture. 
Accordingly, he has established that the Kangoye findings are irrelevant (relevant) for Africa 
when the concept of governance is extended (restricted) to more concepts of government 
(corruption). 
                                                 
4
 Recently, Fosu (2013a) has documented an interesting strand of literature on multi-polar strategies of development. 
They include, inter alia, lessons from: Latin America & the Caribbean  (Trejos, 2013; De Mello, 2013;  Solimano, 
2013; Pozo et al., 2013; Cardoso, 2013); East Asia & the Pacific (Warr, 2013; Thoburn, 2013;  Lee, 2013; Jomo & 
Wee, 2013; Khan, 2013); the emerging Asian giants of China & India (Singh, 2013; Yao, 2013; Santos-Paulino, 
2013); the Middle East & North Africa (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013; Looney, 2013; Drine, 2013; Nyarko, 2013b) and; 
sub-Saharan Africa (Fosu, 2013b; Subramanian, 2013;  Robinson, 2013; Lundahl & Petersson, 2013;  Naudé, 2013).  
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 While there has been a substantial literature on the aid-institution nexus, as far as we have 
reviewed, very few studies have focused on the aid-democracy relationship. We discuss the 
literature in terms of literature review (Brown, 2005) as well as positive (Knack, 2004; Kangoye, 
2011) and mixed (positive and negative) effects (Kano & Montinola, 2009; Kalyvitis & Vlachaki 
2008) of foreign aid on democracy.   
 Brown (2005) has essentially focused on a review of the literature based on the 
disappointing results of international efforts of democratization that are for the most part 
attributed to domestic conditions which substantially hamper the establishment and survival of 
democracy. The study acknowledges substantial structural setbacks exist and that the 
democratization process is mainly due to an endogenous scenario or domestic factors. It further 
argues that international actors who are most often absent from mainstream democratization 
theories could however play a major role in the prevention (or promotion) of democratization 
processes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  Unfortunately, the mission of donors in the promotion of 
quick transition to multiparty systems of democracy could hold-back the democratization 
process.  
 On the positive effects, Knack (2004) has concluded that aid potentially contributed to 
processes of democratization in many ways, inter alia: (1) via technical assistance that targets 
electoral processes, promotes civil society organizations like freedom of the press, consolidates 
the legislatures and judiciaries and (2) improvements in  education and income which are ideal 
for democratization and via conditionality.  Kangoye (2011), using the same title as Knack 
(2004) has established that aid could mitigate the negative effects of terms of trade volatility on 
democracy. Kano & Montinola (2009) concluded that aid helps autocrats (democrats) more in the 
long-run (short-term); there is strong evidence supporting the positive association between 
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democratic aid flows and the possibility of observing fully- or partly-democratic political regimes 
(Kalyvitis & Vlachaki, 2008). 
 The present study steers clear of the above literature from two standpoints. First, it is 
focused on the period after the fall of the Berlin wall, since the collapse of the wall was followed 
by a substantial change in aid-democracy policies (Gibson et al., 2014). Accordingly: Knack 
(2004) has used data for the period 1975-2000; Kangoye (2011), 1980-2003; Kano & Montinola 
(2009), 1960-1999; Kalyvitis & Vlachaki (2008), 1972-2004. Second, in light of stylized facts 
and recent developments in the aid debates, we focus on aid uncertainty.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 We assess a panel of 53 African nations with annual data from World Bank Development 
Indicators for the period 1996-2010. The periodicity has a twofold justification. First, as 
documented above, it enables us to capture how aid volatilities have affected political rights after 
the fall of the Berlin wall. Second, for comparative purposes, the same periodicity has been 
employed by most of the underlying studies discussed in the debate strands on ‘aid and 
institutions’ of the literature section also above (for example the Okada, Samreth, Asongu & 
Jellal debate)
5
.  
 The dependent variables are institutionalized autocracies and democracies. Net official 
development assistance (NODA) is the principal independent variable to which we add NODA 
from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries for robustness purposes. 
Consistent with Asongu (2014c), foreign aid volatilities are computed in a twofold manner:  (1) 
standard errors or standard deviations of the saved residuals after first-order autoregressive 
                                                 
5
 Accordingly, Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a), Asongu (2013a) and Asongu & Jellal (2013) have 
respectively used data for the period ‘1995-2009’, ‘1996-2010’, ‘1996-2010’ and ‘1996-2010’.  
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processes of the NODA indicators and (2) simple standard deviations of three-year intervals. The 
former approach is in line with Kangoye (2013).    
 There is a fourfold justification for the choice of three-year averages in terms of non-
overlapping intervals (NOI). First, there is a one degree of freedom loss when the residuals are 
computed with first-order autoregressive processes. Moreover, a minimum of two periods are 
required to compute the standard deviations of corresponding residuals.  Second, using data 
averages enables the mitigation of short-term disturbances. Third, with three year NOI, the basic 
conditions for the use of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) are fulfilled (N>T: 53>5). 
Fourth, data averages restrict overidentification or limit the proliferation of instruments by 
ensuring that the instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in every specification.  
 Consistent with Asongu (2014c), in the regressions, we control for economic prosperity in 
terms of GDP growth, trade openness, government expenditure and inflation. The expected sign 
of government expenditure is ambiguous at best. It could be positive (negative) on political rights 
if the funds are from taxation (foreign aid). The tax effort and aid channels are consistent with 
Eubank (2012) and Asongu & Jellal (2013) respectively. Globalization reflected in trade 
openness has been documented to improve governance standards (Khandelwal & Roitman, 
2012), though more in high income countries (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014a). Economic 
prosperity with respect to income-levels has also been documented to be instrumental in 
improving government quality (Asongu, 2012, p. 191). The expected sign from inflation to 
political rights is also ambiguous. Accordingly, it could be appealing if adopted measures in 
response to consumer price inflation are designed to improve on government quality and mitigate 
soaring prices. Alternatively, it could also seriously affect social order when the issues are not 
timely tackled. The latter postulation is consistent with the documented causes of the Arab Spring 
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(Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012; Asongu, 2015). In the GMM specifications, time-effects are also 
employed to control for the unobserved heterogeneity.  
 The variables are defined in Appendix 1, the summary statistics reported in Appendix 2, 
while Appendix 3 presents the correlation matrix. The latest is employed to mitigate potential 
issues of multicollinearity and overparameterization in the NODA variables and their 
corresponding distortions. From the variations observed in Appendix 2, we can be confident that 
reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 Consistent with Asongu (2013b), a dynamic panel GMM estimation approach is adopted 
for three principal reasons: first, it has some bite on endogeneity as it controls for time invariant 
omitted variables, second, it does not eliminate cross-country regressions and third, it corrects 
small sample bias issues from difference estimators. Therefore, this third advantage is the main 
criterion that has guided our preference for system GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & 
Bond, 1998; Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4) in relation to a difference GMM estimator (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991). A heteroscedasticity-consistent two-step method is used instead of the one-step 
procedure which is homoscedasticity-consistent. Two main tests are performed to assess the 
validity of the models, notably: the over-identifying restrictions (OIR) Sargan test for the validity 
of instruments and; the Arellano & Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. The interests of using data averages in terms of 3 year NOI have 
already been discussed in the data section.  
 The following equations in levels (Eq. 1) and first difference (Eq. 2) represent the GMM 
approach.    
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 Where: ‘t’ denotes the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. PR represents political rights in 
terms of democracy or autocracy; T , Total NODA; DAC , NODA from DAC countries; X is the 
set of control variables (Government expenditure, Trade openness, GDP growth, and Inflation); 
t  is a time-specific constant; i is a country-specific effect  and;  ti ,  an error term. The 
estimation procedure involves jointly estimating the equation in level with that in first-difference, 
therefore exploiting all the orthogonality or parallel conditions between the lagged endogenous 
variable and the error term.  
 
4. Empirical results  
 
 The section addresses two main issues: the effect of foreign aid on political rights and the 
impact of aid distortions or uncertainty on political rights. We have taken a minimalist approach 
by assuming that foreign aid volatilities exclusively are determined by the interest of donor 
nations to foster political rights in African countries. In other words, it could be said that the 
distribution of foreign aid is essentially based on the degree of political governance in a given 
country. This assumption appears somewhat plausible in light of the case of Zimbabwe 
(discussed in Section 4.3.1).  
 While Section 1 is based on aid volatilities measured as simple standard deviations (Table 
1), in Section 2, foreign aid uncertainty is appreciated as the standard deviations of residuals after 
first-order autoregressive processes in the NODA variables (Table 2). Based on the information 
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criteria for the validity of models, the null hypothesis of the OIR Sargan and AR(2) are not 
overwhelmingly rejected
6
.  
 
4.1 Distortions as standard deviations 
   
 Table 1 below uses basic standard deviations as volatilities. While Table A contains 
specifications with total NODA, Table B reflects those with NODA from DAC countries.  Two 
main findings are established: the effect of foreign aid on political rights is insignificant while the 
impact of foreign aid volatilities on democracy is negative. The significant control variable has 
the expected sign: inflation could substantially affect democratic processes.  
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
 
4.2 Robustness checks with volatilities as standard errors  
 
 In Table 2 below, the specifications of Table 1 are replicated with total NODA (Panel A) 
and NODA from DAC countries (Panel B) for robustness purposes. The results are consistent 
with those of Table 1 above. Hence, while the effect of aid on political rights is not significant, 
that of volatilities on democracy is negative. The significant control variable also has the 
expected sign.  
 
                                                            “Insert Table 2 here” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 In essence, we have performed two tests in order to assess the validity of the models, notably:  the Arellano & Bond 
autocorrelation test that examines the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the Sargan-test which examines over-
identification restrictions. The latter test assesses whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the 
main equation. Overwhelmingly for all the models, we have neither been able to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis for 
the absence of autocorrelation nor the Sargan null for instrument validity.  
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4.3 Discussion of results and policy implications 
 
4.3.1 Discussion of results  
 
 The findings are broadly consistent with the literature on aid conditionality for political 
objectives in recipient countries (Killick, 2003; Crawford, 2001; Carothers, 2000; Stokke, 2013; 
Hayman, 2011; Faust, 2010). It is widely believed that foreign aid as a policy instrument for the 
promotion of political rights in recipient countries could be manipulated by donors to achieve the 
objective of enhancing democracy. This has been the case of Zimbabwe in recent years where aid 
manipulations for regime change only further consolidated power by the ZANU PF party. This 
shows how foreign aid uncertainty could be used by populist parties to promote a Western 
neocolonial agenda, instill nationalistic sentiments and consolidate their grip on power. 
Accordingly, since foreign aid benefits even those of the opposition political parties, in the long-
term they too could start dancing to these populist tunes. A recent (early 2014) example is 
Uganda where an anti-gay bill voted by the legislature and signed into law by president Youweri 
Museveni has been greeted with a suspension of aid/loans by some donor countries, including 
multinational institutions like the World Bank. This is against the background that majority of 
Ugandans approve of such a bill.  
 In a nutshell, making foreign aid uncertain as a policy instrument to promote political 
rights in poor countries could instead become a political instrument to prolong stay in power. 
This is especially true if the ‘foreign aid dictated measure’ is unpopular and ‘recipient country 
leadership’ is unwilling to comply with the dictated measure because it is unpopular. Moreover, 
this sends a strong signal that African governments are constrained to be accountable to donors 
instead of any  electorate that put them into office. This scenario contradicts the very essence of 
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political accountability. In essence, democracy that is locally-oriented and consolidates feedbacks 
from citizens is a more appealing instrument for political governance than outside pressure.   
 In fact it is important to understand why the findings are they way they are. Accordingly, 
the political economy perspective of foreign aid is crucial in grasping these findings since the 
ambitions underlying aid are cocktails of culture, institutions, power distribution and dynamics of 
competitive interests (Schraeder et al., 1998; Hopkins, 2000). In other words , foreign aid is the 
product of bargaining of some nature in the political market that involves recipient governments, 
donor aid bureaucracies and multilateral assistance agencies. Essentially, different goals have 
motivated donors over time. Whereas  Japanese and Chinese aid is motivated predominantly by 
economic gains, French assistance and Nordic aid are guided by politico-economic gains and 
global welfare improvement respectively.  
 With some exceptions of  the emerging economies of East Asia, more concessions are 
increasingly being offered by African recipient nations to donor preferences in exchange for more 
aid. But most of these concessions are positively sanctioned by the electorate. One might even be 
tempted to establish that the strength with which foreign aid pressures was resisted by Egypt in 
the 1960s is not yet over. Accordingly, despite the threat of foreign aid uncertainties which 
represent a significant percentage of Egyptian budget and military expenditure, the definition of 
democracy has been revisited and redefined on several occasions over the past months in the 
country. Indeed there is a wide perception that the revolution was partly foreign-funded. While 
the manner in which this perception has affected the mechanics by which Morsi was ousted and a 
former military officer has become president with less than 50% of the population going to polls 
is unknown. An interesting lesson drawn from this experience is articulately summarized by 
Elagati (2013, p. 18): “Changing Egyptians’ mindset about foreign funding is part of the task of 
moving from an authoritarian culture to a democratic one that understands and values the 
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positive role played by civil society, political parties and the media. In order to change this 
mindset, fears of foreign funding need to be slowly deconstructed via a transparent public 
debate”.  
 The above explanation goes  a long way to establishing that, whereas African countries 
have today been substantially transformed into supplicants that come-up with a good number of 
projects in the hope that more aid would be granted (Lancaster, 1999; Hopkins, 2000), public 
perception may have the last say on who stays in power whether by real or crony democratic 
means.  It is broadly in accordance with a recent stream of aid literature that has requested the 
imperative for a more thorough approach to development assistance: one that clearly articulates 
the needs and wants of citizens in recipients countries (Monni & Spaventa, 2013; Krause, 2013; 
Marglin, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Titumir & Kamal, 2013; Banuri, 2013; Ghosh, 2013). In 
essence, the ramifications could be unappealing for donor image if aid distortions are not 
consistent with the demands of the electorate
7
. Kindiki (2011) has recommended the need for 
African nations to overcome their dependence on donor countries. A stance that is in line with: 
Ndilovu-Gatsheni (2013) on Africa’s entrapment within some colonial webs and matrices. The 
position of Amin (2013) that neocolonialism could be managing development assistance is a 
perception that could be used by recipient governments in clinging onto power when aid 
uncertainties from donors are not founded on solid grounds. He has further professed that 
development is not a process that can be left to the whims and caprices of donors. A stance 
shared by Obeng-Odoom (2013) on the imperative of foreign aid to be essentially fueled by 
African needs. For instance, there are narratives in the aid literature sustaining that developing 
countries appreciate qualitative characteristics like happiness more (Arvin & Lew, 2010ab, 2011, 
2012ab).  
                                                 
7
 We discuss this  in some detail in the paragraph on a new Washington consensus below.  
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4.3.2 Implications for underlying debates  
  
 It has been observed from the findings that foreign aid distortions as a policy instrument 
for the promotion of political rights is a considerable policy reversal because it brings about the 
opposite effect. This finding contributes to the underlying literature and recent debates in a 
sixfold manner. First, it is a confirmation of the Moyo conjecture/hypothesis on the short-term 
inappropriateness of the Washington consensus on the priority of political rights (Moyo, 2013).  
The short-term inference draws from the fact that GMM estimated coefficients are interpreted as 
short-term effects, essentially because non-overlapping intervals have been employed to mitigate 
short-run disturbances that may loom substantially. Second, the Lalountas et al. (2011) conjecture 
that has been verified in Africa by Asongu (2014a)
8
 is also broadly confirmed. Therefore with 
globalization, African nations could be more preoccupied by economic rights than political 
rights. This interpretation is based on an underlying hypothesis that development assistance is an 
instrument of globalization (‘privatize/liberalize and you would receive more aid’). Third, with 
respect to the Okada & Samreth (2012) and ‘Asongu & Jellal (2013) and Asongu (2012a, 2013a)’ 
debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on the quality of institutions’, the Okada & Samreth 
corruption-related results for  developing countries may yet be irrelevant for Africa. Fourth, 
institutions may be more endogenous to productive structures, economic rights or economic 
prosperity (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Ortmann, 2012; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014). Fifth, 
partial confirmation of the level and time hypotheses for the rewards  of liberal democracy (Scott, 
                                                 
8
 Asongu (2014a) has verified the Lalountas et al. (2011, p. 645) hypothesis in Africa: “Thus, our main conclusion is 
that globalization could be a powerful means of fighting corruption, only for middle and high income countries. For 
low income countries however, globalization has no significant impact on corruption. We might therefore conclude 
that at low levels of per capita income emphasis is given to the economic dimension of international integration and 
as a result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited. Persistence on globalization as an effective means to 
reduce corruption in developing countries might lead to inappropriate policies. On the contrary, at high levels of per 
capita income emphasis is given to the political and social dimensions of globalization and as a result the effects of 
this phenomenon on corruption control are significant” (page 645). 
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1972; Lemarchand, 1972; Sayari, 1977; Wade, 1985; Weyland, 1998; Varsee, 1997; Montinola & 
Jackman, 2002; Back & Hadenius, 2008; Sung, 2004; Asongu,  2012b; Asongu, 2011). Sixth, 
more light is thrown into: Eubank (2012) versus Asongu (2014b) and Kongoye (2013) versus 
Asongu (2014b) literature. Essentially because less reliance on foreign aid by partial democracies 
could oblige governments to improve governance standards in exchange for more tax revenues 
from the local population who are only willing to consent to paying more taxes if the government 
improves its economic and institutional dimensions. Notably: the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (economic governance) and the 
improvement of respect by the state and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between 
them (institutional governance).  
 
4.3.3 Implications for a new Washington Consensus 
 
 While donors and past colonial masters are increasingly bargaining for more influence 
with their money, the task at hand is to request higher standards of governance that are consistent 
with the demands of the local population. Hence, this would enhance democracy and not be used 
by populist political parties against aid donors.   
 In order to fully understand the need for a new Washington consensus, we devote some 
space to elucidate the recent experience of Uganda. As reported by Aljazeera (February, 2014), in 
support of the planned freeze or change (uncertainty) of aid programmes in Uganda by Norway, 
the Netherlands and Denmark, the World Bank promptly froze aid to the country over the anti-
gay law. The reason given for the suspension was that the global lender who wanted to ascertain 
the US$90 million loan ensured objectives of development that were not adversely affected by 
the new law. In response, the Ugandan government was quick to ask the World Bank to keep its 
aid and that the country could develop without Western assistance. The Ugandan government 
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remained confident because it had the support of the people in the passing of the bill. Indeed 
qualification of the bill by US Secretary of State John Kerry as ‘flat-out morally wrong’ and 
‘atrocious’ and further comparing it with the standards of apartheid in South Africa or ‘anti-
Semitic legislation in Nazi Germany’ did not go down well with the Ugandan government.  
 We have found from our results that using foreign aid uncertainty to achieve democracy 
may end-up mitigating the democracy that the volatility was initially aimed at enhancing. Hence, 
as a principal policy recommendation, donors should carefully consider the stakes before using 
foreign aid uncertainty as a tool to enhance political rights in recipient countries. They should not 
stake their reputation on issues that are strongly supported by the electorates, else, they simply 
give those in power more instruments and incentives with which to consolidate their grip on 
power.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 Before the collapse of the Berlin wall, the underlying motivations of foreign aid were 
Cold War strategies. The enhancement of political rights was not an essential item on the 
development agenda. Developing countries receiving substantial amounts of foreign aid did not 
improve in political rights or democratic standards because it was not in the interest of donor 
nations for them to become primarily accountable to their citizens. After the Cold War, the 
Washington consensus adopted the promotion of political rights as a prime development strategy 
and used foreign aid to enforce the goal. Hence,  a wide consensus that foreign aid as a policy 
instrument for the promotion of political rights in recipient countries has been made uncertain by 
donors so as to achieve the objective of enhancing democracy. This study has complemented 
existing literature on the aid-institutions nexus by focusing on: political rights, aid volatilities 
and, the post-Berlin Wall period. The findings show that while foreign aid does not have a 
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significant effect on political rights, foreign aid volatilities do mitigate democracy in recipient 
countries. Volatilities could be used by populist parties to promote a neocolonial agenda, instill 
nationalistic sentiments and consolidate their grip on power. This is especially the case when 
donors are asking for standards that the majority of the population do not want and political 
leaders are unwilling to implement. This sends a strong signal on political accountability reversal: 
governments are constrained to be more accountable to donors instead of the electorate that put 
them into office. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-
2010. As a main policy implication, using foreign aid uncertainty as an instrument of political 
rights enhancement in African countries may achieve the opposite results. Other implications are 
discussed including the need for a new Washington consensus.  
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Table 1: Foreign aid uncertainties with standard deviations 
         
 Dependent variable: Political Rights   
 Panel A: Total Foreign Aid  
         
 Foreign Aid  Foreign Aid Volatilities   
 Autocracy  Democracy Autocracy  Democracy 
Gov (-1)   0.911*** 0.977*** 0.290 0.337 0.936*** 0.991*** 0.314 0.313 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.239) (0.267) (0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.283) 
Constant  -0.404 -0.925 1.905 2.021 -0.378 -0.802 2.196* 2.120* 
 (0.629) (0.385) (0.204) (0.249) (0.582) (0.393) (0.074) (0.069) 
NODA (Total) 0.003 0.001 -0.040 -0.025 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.901) (0.952) (0.605) (0.803)     
NODASD1 (Total) --- --- --- --- -0.009 0.0008 -0.151** -0.154** 
     (0.840) (0.985) (0.045) (0.038) 
Gov. Expenditure -0.007 -0.004 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.513) (0.705) (0.544) (0.627) (0.565) (0.641) (0.377) (0.439) 
GDP growth  -0.017 0.004 0.029 0.031 -0.018 -0.003 0.011 0.021 
 (0.704) (0.902) (0.673) (0.697) (0.590) (0.942) (0.857) (0.790) 
Trade  0.006 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.005 0.0004 0.0007 
 (0.229) (0.191) (0.743) (0.952) (0.229) (0.289) (0.975) (0.967) 
Inflation   0.0003 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.0005 0.001 -0.016* -0.015* 
 (0.954) (0.743) (0.228) (0.473) (0.946) (0.799) (0.057) (0.064) 
         
Time effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.164) (0.196) (0.891) (0.756) (0.111) (0.161) (0.210) (0.230) 
Sargan OIR (0.555) (0.806) (0.553) (0.372) (0.487) (0.773) (0.566) (0.365) 
Wald  (joint) 216.21*** 166.93*** 51.665*** 22.538*** 421.48*** 248.65*** 18.825*** 12.091*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  15 18 15 18 11 18 15 18 
Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations  112 112 112 112 112 111 111 111 
         
         
 Panel B: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries 
 Foreign Aid  Foreign Aid Volatilities  
 Autocracy  Democracy Autocracy  Democracy 
     
Gov (-1) 0.917*** 0.976*** 0.281 0.328 0.948*** 0.989*** 0.296 0.314 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.246) (0.272) (0.000) (0.000) (0.264) (0.294) 
Constant  -0.189 -0.756 2.193 2.294 -0.398 -0.756 2.071* 2.099* 
 (0.849) (0.546) (0.120) (0.141) (0.493) (0.450) (0.066) (0.062) 
NODADAC -0.020 -0.012 -0.082 -0.064 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.727) (0.784) (0.442) (0.675)     
NODADACSD1 --- --- --- --- -0.015 -0.013 -0.138** -0.140** 
     (0.755) (0.790) (0.046) (0.046) 
Gov. Expenditure -0.007 -0.005 -0.014 -0.015 -0.007 -0.007 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.509) (0.669) (0.419) (0.490) (0.527) (0.584) (0.437) (0.425) 
GDP growth  -0.020 0.006 0.033 0.034 -0.018 -0.001 0.010 0.017 
 (0.586) (0.884) (0.677) (0.697) (0.568) (0.981) (0.883) (0.839) 
Trade  0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 
 (0.236) (0.188) (0.842) (0.882) (0.195) (0.306) (0.904) (0.996) 
Inflation   -0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.009 -0.0004 0.001 -0.016* -0.015* 
 (0.831) (0.865) (0.173) (0.420) (0.952) (0.908) (0.061) (0.066) 
         
Time effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.239) (0.219) (0.945) (0.750) (0.131) (0.183) (0.313) (0.342) 
Sargan OIR (0.476) (0.756) (0.566) (0.358) (0.488) (0.742) (0.572) (0.373) 
Wald  (joint) 421.90*** 337.54*** 58.166*** 21.44*** 2071.2*** 1143.5*** 20.67*** 14.417** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.025) 
Instruments  15 18 15 18 15 18 15 18 
Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations  112 112 112 112 111 111 111 111 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
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bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODASD1(Total): Volatilities by Simple Standard Deviation of 
Total NODA.  NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODADAC SD1: Volatilities by 
Simple Standard Deviation from NODADAC.       
 
Table 2: Foreign aid uncertainties with standard errors 
         
 Dependent variable: Political Rights   
 Panel A: Total Foreign Aid  
         
 Foreign Aid  Foreign Aid Volatilities  
 Autocracy  Democracy Autocracy  Democracy 
Gov (-1)   0.911*** 0.977*** 0.290 0.337 0.946*** 0.992*** 0.309 0.316 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.239) (0.267) (0.000) (0.000) (0.254) (0.273) 
Constant  -0.404 -0.925 1.905 2.021 -0.402 -0.796 2.191* 2.128* 
 (0.629) (0.385) (0.204) (0.249) (0.475) (0.404) (0.074) (0.057) 
NODA (Total) 0.003 0.001 -0.040 -0.025 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.901) (0.952) (0.605) (0.803)     
NODASD2 (Total) --- --- --- --- -0.006 -0.002 -0.102* -0.105** 
     (0.809) (0.950) (0.066) (0.038) 
Gov. Expenditure -0.007 -0.004 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.015 
 (0.513) (0.705) (0.544) (0.627) (0.481) (0.636) (0.461) (0.474) 
GDP growth  -0.017 0.004 0.029 0.031 -0.018 -0.002 -0.002 0.014 
 (0.704) (0.902) (0.673) (0.697) (0.630) (0.949) (0.976) (0.866) 
Trade  0.006 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.005 0.0008 0.0006 
 (0.229) (0.191) (0.743) (0.952) (0.214) (0.292) (0.954) (0.973) 
Inflation   0.0003 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 0.0001 0.001 -0.016* -0.016* 
 (0.954) (0.743) (0.228) (0.473) (0.978) (0.822) (0.069) (0.058) 
         
Time effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.164) (0.196) (0.891) (0.756) (0.103) (0.140) (0.290) (0.282) 
Sargan OIR (0.555) (0.806) (0.553) (0.372) (0.505) (0.762) (0.563) (0.350) 
Wald  (joint) 216.21*** 166.93*** 51.665*** 22.538*** 403.54*** 321.24*** 14.920** 14.242** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.027) 
Instruments  15 18 15 18 15 18 15 18 
Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations  112 112 112 112 111 111 111 111 
         
         
 Panel B: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries 
 Foreign Aid  Foreign Aid Volatilities  
 Autocracy  Democracy Autocracy  Democracy 
     
Gov (-1) 0.917*** 0.976*** 0.281 0.328 0.944*** 0.991*** 0.286 0.303 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.246) (0.272) (0.000) (0.000) (0.270) (0.295) 
Constant  -0.189 -0.756 2.193 2.294 -0.391 -0.780 2.112* 1.987* 
 (0.849) (0.546) (0.120) (0.141) (0.505) (0.426) (0.065) (0.063) 
NODADAC -0.020 -0.012 -0.082 -0.064 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.727) (0.784) (0.442) (0.675)     
NODADACSD2 --- --- --- --- -0.010 -0.005 -0.107** -0.109** 
     (0.756) (0.894) (0.022) (0.010) 
Gov. Expenditure -0.007 -0.005 -0.014 -0.015 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.015 
 (0.509) (0.669) (0.419) (0.490) (0.463) (0.610) (0.425) (0.427) 
GDP growth  -0.020 0.006 0.033 0.034 -0.017 -0.002 0.005 0.017 
 (0.586) (0.884) (0.677) (0.697) (0.649) (0.955) (0.943) (0.832) 
Trade  0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.001 
 (0.236) (0.188) (0.842) (0.882) (0.220) (0.299) (0.879) (0.928) 
Inflation   -0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.009 -0.0004 0.001 -0.017** -0.016** 
 (0.831) (0.865) (0.173) (0.420) (0.948) (0.874) (0.041) (0.024) 
         
Time effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.239) (0.219) (0.945) (0.750) (0.119) (0.157) (0.372) (0.328) 
Sargan OIR (0.476) (0.756) (0.566) (0.358) (0.510) (0.756) (0.587) (0.368) 
Wald  (joint) 421.90*** 337.54*** 58.166*** 21.44*** 1737.4*** 824.29*** 28.284*** 51.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  15 18 15 18 15 18 15 18 
Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
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Observations  112 112 112 112 111 111 111 111 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODASD1(Total): Volatilities by Standard Errors of Total 
NODA.  NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee..NODADAC SD1: Volatilities by 
Standard Errors from NODADAC.       
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
NODA (Total) Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA) (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
NODADAC  NODA from the Development Assistance Committee Countries 
(% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
NODASD1 (Total)  Distortions of Total NODA by Simple Standard Deviation  Author 
   
NODADACSD1 Distortions of NODADAC by Simple Standard Deviation.  
 
Author 
NODASD2 (Total)  Distortions of Total NODA by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
NODADACSD2 Distortions of NODADAC by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy   
Institutionalized democracy.  Democracy is conceived as three 
essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of 
institutions and procedures through which citizens can express 
effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. 
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of 
political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such 
as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of 
the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, 
these general principles.  
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Autocracy  Institutionalized autocracy. The opposite definition of 
Institutionalized democracy above.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
   
GDP growth  Gross Domestic Product growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
Government Expenditure  Government Final Consumption Expenditure(% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. NODADAC: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. NODAMD: NODA from 
Multilateral Donors. SD1: Distortions by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Distortions by Standard Deviation of the Residuals after first-order 
autoregressive processes.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Total NODA 10.889 12.029 0.015 102.97 253 
NODADAC 6.278 7.303 -0.003 68.063 253 
First Distortions from Total NODA 2.841 6.460 0.001 64.113 250 
First Distortions from Total NODADAC 1.868 4.790 0.0005 44.404 250 
Second  Distortions from Total NODA 3.409 8.106 0.005 91.927 250 
Second  Distortions from Total NODADAC 2.201 6.333 0.001 68.826 250 
Autocracy  1.905 3.401 -8.000 9.000 250 
Democracy 2.373 3.871 -8.000 10.000 250 
GDP growth   4.755 5.587 -11.272 49.367 254 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
Government Expenditure  4.495 8.064 -17.387 49.275 164 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: 
Development Assistance Committee. SD1: Distortions by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Distortions by Standard Deviation of the Residuals 
after first-order autoregressive processes.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis 
             
Foreign Aid Foreign Aid Uncertainty Control Variables Political Rights  
Aid1 Aid2 Aid1SD1 Aid2SD1 Aid1SD2 Aid2SD2 GDPg Trade Gov. Exp Inflation  Autocracy Democracy  
1.000 0.975 0.770 0.681 0.756 0.685 0.114 -0.083 0.078 -0.023 -0.265 -0.001 Aid1 
 1.000 0.805 0.756 0.809 0.767 0.109 -0.061 0.077 -0.011 -0.276 -0.015 Aid2 
  1.000 0.921 0.949 0.878 0.219 0.082 0.014 -0.004 -0.242 -0.133 Aid1SD1 
   1.000 0.901 0.946 0.193 0.050 0.024 0.011 -0.245 -0.141 Aid2SD1 
    1.000 0.945 0.145 0.101 0.028 -0.003 -0.213 -0.078 Aid1SD2 
     1.000 0.091 0.091 0.028 -0.0006 -0.217 -0.088 Aid2SD2 
      1.000 0.179 0.254 -0.132 0.098 0.014 GDPg 
       1.000 -0.070 0.024 0.131 0.005 Trade 
        1.000 -0.243 0.073 0.051 Gov. Exp. 
         1.000 0.041 -0.058 Inflation 
          1.000 0.020 Autocracy 
           1.000 Democracy 
             
Aid1: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). Aid2: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries (NODADAC). Aid1SD1: NODA 
Distortions by Simple Standard Deviations. Aid2SD1: NODADAC Distortions by Simple Standard Deviations. Aid1SD2: NODA Distortions by Simple Standard Errors. Aid2SD2: 
NODADAC Distortions by Simple Standard Errors. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product growth. Trade: Trade Openness. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure.  
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